Hobbes and the Making of Modern Political Thought by Hull Gordon

Author:Hull, Gordon
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK
Published: 2009-03-05T16:00:00+00:00

5.4 Deter Thy Neighbor

What, then, of the logic of life in the natural state? Could people get out of it? Because a good deal of attention has been given to this question, I think it is worth reviewing in light of the failure of communicative systems I have outlined above. As I have already indicated, I think the tendency to frame this question as a problem (how to get out of the state of nature) for which Hobbes must provide a solution is misplaced. In what follows, I want to suggest that the question is aporetic in the sense that the logic of Hobbes’s description, and its overdetermination by communicative failures, produce a series of interpretive dilemmas which make it impossible for hypothetical actors in the natural condition to rationally make the move to collective rationality presupposed by any bootstrapping process. In other words, that actors in the state of nature cannot form contracts is symptomatic of larger problems in the natural condition. I thus offer the following analytic comments to carry to its completion the implications of the Hobbesian state of nature. In games-theoretic terms, the general situation has to be that of a single-play prisoner’s dilemma. To put it differently, “non-cooperation is the equilibrium state.”48 Because no one can ensure his or her own survivability, and because there is no credible way of sorting out the signals of another, all such situations are high risk.49 The magnification of uncertainty makes it very difficult to rationally make the leap of faith required to assume that the game is iterated, and, consequently, makes estimation of how many iterations the game might continue even harder. The situation also makes it difficult to assume that one could live another day to educate one’s interlocutor about the benefits of cooperation. Even the most rational of actors has to assume that her interlocutor either correctly understands his own weakness or not. If he does, he will try to deceive her into thinking he is stronger. If he does not understand his weakness, he will also posture aggressively to compensate. Thus, one is likely to encounter almost nothing but aggressive posturing, which further makes confidence-building measures difficult. Hence, Hobbes suggests that, in a condition of “tumult,” those who distrust their own wit enough that they do not “consult” but instead “strike first” are “better disposed to victory” (L 11.10, 72).

Another risk in the state of nature is accidental conflict.50 There are at least three reasons this risk is particularly high. First, the lack of survivability forces one’s second-order decision strategy—the sorts of decisions one makes about how to behave in a crisis—to a much less stable posture. Is the gentleman approaching with a large axe hostile or cooperative? If I do not think that I can survive a hostile encounter, I will have to make my decision about how to respond very, very early in that encounter. This means that I will be more inclined to misread ambiguous signals. Second, the geographic proximity of those in state of nature encounters reduces response time, which further pressures my decision calculus.

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